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Abstract 
This article analyzes consumer choices in the US beer market by applying the 
random coefficient logit model using grocery store scanner data. I measure 
the effect of promotion on the beer demand and the substitution patterns for 
more than 200 beer products. I also conduct policy simulation to evaluate the 
promotionaly performance of beer products. The estimated parameters 
suggest that promotions significantly affect consumer choice. The estimated 
own-price elasticities range from 0.27 to 2.28 in absolute value, indicating that 
consumers’ price sensitivities are highly heterogeneous across different beer 
products. The cross elasticities are very small, with a maximum of 0.03, 
suggesting that consumers tend to be loyal to their preferred beers. Results 
from the policy simulation show that promotion policies, including Price 
Reduction, Feature, and Display, would effectively expand the demand for the 
beer category and increase retailers’ revenues.  
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1 Introduction 
The beer industry in the US has experienced remarkable concentration since 
the mid-1930, and the number of American brewers dropped drastically with 
several leading companies dominating the US beer market (Tremblay & 
Tremblay, 2005). These brewers produce the vast majority of American beers, 
and the competition in the mass-produced beer market is characterized by 
nearly homogenous products (Tremblay, Iwasaki, & Tremblay, 2005).  
Competitors become more reliant on promotion as a means of differentiating 
beer products. There is an increasing trend in advertising spending on in-store 
promotion, and practitioners allocate a significant proportion of their marketing 
budget toward trade promotions on consumer packaged goods (Ailawadi, 
Beauchamp, Gauri, & Donthu, 2009). The in-store promotion is a cost-
effective marketing strategy. It produces an immediate sales increase. In 
addition, with the application of scanner data, practitioners can better evaluate 
the performance of certain products (Blattberg, Briesch, & Fox,1995).  
The in-store promotion typically occurs in three forms: temporary price cut, 
feature advertising in stores’ weekly newspapers, and display at the end of 
aisles or on shelves. These marketing devices can draw new customers, sell 
unsold goods, and induce the purchase of higher marginal products (Blattberg 
et al., 1995). Their use has proved to be successful for many packaged goods 
such as grand coffee, toothpaste, and carbonate drink (Guadagni & Little, 
1983; Hardesty & Bearden, 2003; Howell, Lee, & Allenby, 2016). However, 
little is known about the effects of in-store promotion on beer demand. Nearly 
90% of stores in the US implement alcohol promotion (Terry-McElrath, 
Harwood, & Wagenaar, 2003). Is the money spent on promotion worth it? 
Whether the store owners benefit from the promotion? Answering these 
questions constitutes the primary goal of my study.  
To determine the effects of the in-store promotion, I estimate the demand 
system of beer markets in the US. Specifically, I use consumer choice 
probability as a measure of demand. The reason is that beer is a relatively 
low-priced good with different tastes and types. Consumer choice behavior is 
8 
 
a crucial determinant of purchase probability. In addition, I analyze the effects 
of promotion from retailers’ perspective and examine changes in sales due to 
promotion for the beer category. To achieve this goal, I study the performance 
of individual beer products and aggregate their revenues to obtain the revenue 
for the beer category.  
After estimating the beer demand, I use the results to analyze the substitution 
patterns among beer products. Doing this entails estimating the price 
elasticities. The own-price elasticity measures consumer sensitivity to 
changes in prices. The cross-price elasticity measures whether these beer 
products are substitutes for each other. Knowing the substitution patterns help 
predict the impacts of promoted beers on demand for other beers that are not 
promoted, and the net impacts constitute retailers’ gain. 
With the understanding of the beer demand and the substitution patterns, I 
proceed to carry out policy simulations. The major promotion policies in this 
study include Price Reduction (an indicator if the temporary price cut is greater 
than 5%), Major Feature ad (large-sized advertising in stores’ newspapers), 
and End-of-Aisle Display (arrays at the end of aisles). I list five scenarios to 
evaluate the of these three marketing devices, as well as the joint use of Major 
Feature ad and End-of-Aisle Display and the joint use of all three 
aforementioned devices. The results are then used to recommend optimal 
marketing strategies for retailers who wish to maximize their revenues.  
This study requires a methodology that can address three issues: a large 
number of beers, the heterogeneity in consumer preference, and the 
endogeneity of price. First, the traditional log-log demand model with 𝐽 beers 
needs to estimate 𝐽2 price coefficients, which would cost many degrees of 
freedom. The random coefficient logit model proposed by Berry, Levinsohn, 
and Pakes (1995, BLP, henceforth) effectively reduces the number of 
parameters to be estimated by projecting the consumer choice onto product 
characteristics. Thus, the number of parameters is the number of 
characteristics, rather than the number of products per se. Second, 
heterogeneity are well known to exist in consumer preference for product 
characteristics, and in their responses to price changes and promotion 
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activities. Failing to consider heterogeneity may lead to bias in the estimation 
and misunderstanding of choice behavior (Abramson, Andrews, & Currim, 
2000). The random coefficients logit model allows different consumers to have 
different taste parameters even when they face the same products. Modeling 
heterogeneity is crucial in predicting a more flexible substitution pattern. For 
example, when the beer prices increase, consumers are supposed to switch 
to similar beers, rather than choose all products with equal probabilities. 
Last, the endogeneity may arise because researchers cannot observe all 
product characteristics. The unobserved characteristics are left in the error 
term and may affect consumers' purchase decisions and brewers' pricing 
strategy. Thus, the price of beers is potentially correlated with the error term. 
The BLP method proposes a GMM estimator that accommodates the use of 
instruments that enter the model nonlinearly. Another benefit of the the 
random coefficient logit model is that it can estimate demand in the absence 
of consumer-level data. This is useful in my estimation, where I observe 
market shares, not individual purchase behavior. Due to the above reasons, I 
employ the BLP method in this study.  
I use scanner data collected from the US grocery stores, which contains 
detailed information for each beer product, including sales, promotion status, 
and product characteristics.  
Results from coefficients estimation show that all promotion variables 
significantly increase beer demand. In terms of the magnitude of coefficients, 
End-of-Aisle Display has the greatest impact on beer demand, followed by 
Major Feature ad, suggesting that communicating the promotion information 
to consumers is crucial. The effect of Price Reduction is smaller than the other 
marketing devices. Note that Price Reduction is a dummy variable signaling 
that there is a price cut. Its small coefficient indicates that only signaling the 
discount information maybe not enough to induce purchase. In addition, I find 
that consumers prefer beers of large size and high alcohol content. The 
estimated own-price elasticities for a given market range from 0.27 to 2.28 in 
absolute value, indicating that consumers’ price sensitivities are highly 
heterogeneous across different beer products. The cross elasticities are very 
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small, with a maximum of 0.03, suggesting that consumers tend to be loyal to 
their favorite beers. Thus, a price cut can attract new customers who are price-
sensitive without losing existing customers who have product loyalty. The 
results of the policy simulation demonstrate that promotions expand demand 
for the beer category. Promoting some beers cannibalizes sales of beers that 
are not promoted, but the increase in revenues exceeds declines. Also, 
promotions have synergy effects. That is, the joint use of two or three 
promotion policies generates a greater effect than the sum of individual 
effects.    
A substantial body of literature emphasizes the demand for beer brands in the 
US. My study is the first to estimate the beer demand system at the product 
level. It is also the first to investigate the effects of promotions on the beer 
demand at this level. It has three significant contributions to the literature.   
First, it contributes to the literature in terms of the size and scope of the data. 
I analyze more than 200 beer products sold in 78 grocery stores with more 
than 500,000 observations. Moreover, unlike previous research, my study 
estimates the beer demand with disaggregated product-level data, 
associating promotion effects with certain beer products. This aligns with 
retailers’ interest as they care more about the performance of the beer 
category than a particular brand. 
Second, the price elasticity of beer brands has been intensively studied 
(Beelitz, 2009; Rojas & Peterson, 2008), whereas knowledge about the 
elasticity of beer products is limited. My study fills the gap by measuring price 
sensitivity of consumers and the substitution patterns within the beer category. 
the findings reveals various patterns for different beer products, shedding 
lights on understanding different consumers behavior.  
Third, this paper recommends practical implications at a strategical level. 
Retailers face a complex problem as to maximize promotion productivity in a 
competing environment. A large number of products and various promotion 
options complicate the decision making. My study provides an understanding 
of the reason why different promotion policies have different impacts on 
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consumer choices, and how consumers would respond to different policies. 
These recommendations can help retailers better be more efficient in 
allocating marketing spending to maximize revenues. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the 
literature on beer demand, promotion, and the discrete choice model. Section 
3 outlines the methodology underlying the estimation. Section 4 describes the 
data, discusses the empirical findings, and provides policy simulation results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Literature review  
2.1 Beer Demand 
The price elasticities of beer demand in the US is an important research topic. 
Early studies estimate price elasticities to investigate the nature of beer 
demand for public implications. For example, Hogarty and Elzinga (1972) 
conduct a seven-year study on the relationship between beer price and 
consumption and conclude that beer demand is price inelastic. The following 
researchers approach this issue with different methods or data, and they 
obtain similar results (Clements & Johnson, 1983; Neslon & Moran, 1995; 
Ruhm et al., 2012). Fogarty (2010) surveys 141 previous studies and find a 
trend that as the number of substitutes for alcoholic beverage increases, the 
price elasticities also increase. He argues that beer as a beverage is inelastic 
because it has only a few substitutes (wine and spirits), and as the number of 
substitutes increases, the price elasticities of beer demand will be higher. This 
argument motivates my use of product-level data. Within the beer category, 
there are numerous competitors. Therefore, each beer product would be more 
elastic. There is little research in the field studying price elasticities of beer at 
the product level. I aim to fill the gap by estimating the beer demand using the 
scanner data that contains product information for each beer. 
Another extensively studied topic around the beer demand in the US is 
whether advertising increases beer consumption. Studies on this topic usually 
employ annual, nation-wide data, where advertising expenditure is the year 
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total for all brands across all media, and prices are yearly indices. Examples 
include Lee and Tremblay (1992), Nelson and Young (2001), and Wilcox, 
Kang, & Chilek (2015), who evaluate the advertising-elasticity for the beer 
demand in the US. They all find minimal or no advertising effects. Saffer (1998) 
attributes the reason to the high-level aggregation of data by pointing out that 
the amount of advertising expenditure has grown to a point around which the 
overall effect flattens. The yearly, nation-wide data usually lack the variation 
to detect the diminishing-to-zero effect. Accordingly, he suggests 
using higher-frequency or cross-sectional data to capture the advertising 
effects usually last less than one year and vary across the local areas. Studies 
employing data with more variations do obtain different and more diverse 
findings. For example, Siegel et al. (2016) show that the influence is more 
evident when consumers are segmented, e.g., advertising has a greater effect 
on the youth. Rojas (2005) utilizes quarterly data from the US supermarkets 
and reports a positive effect of advertising on the overall beer consumption.  
Findings from these studies motivate me to use the disaggregated data that 
report sales information by store by week, providing sufficient variation to 
capture the effects of promotion on the beer demand. 
With disaggregated data, the majority of articles focus on the demand for beer 
brands or a specific category. For example, Rojas and Peterson (2008) 
estimate advertising elasticities for 64 American beer brands and find that 
brand advertising redistributes sales among brands. Yang and Raghubir 
(2005) divide beer brands into groups of different sizes and show that types 
of package affect purchase quantity. Bray, Loomis, & Engelen (2009) examine 
the price elasticities of beers measured in different volumes and find that 
consumers prefer to purchase large packages. 
The use of the brand or category-level data avoids having to estimate a large 
number of products but requires aggregating the data over products. For 
example, the sales for a given brand consists of sales in all sizes. The 
aggregated data are subject to measurement errors and may lead to bias in 
estimates (Andrews & Currim, 2005). For instance, the whole brand will be 
indicated as displayed or featured even if only one item is promoted, resulting 
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in an overestimation of the impacts of promotion. Another issue with 
aggregated data is related to identifying consumer choice. Consumers 
consider the same brands with different sizes or packages as different 
products (Andrews and Currim, 2005), whereas in brand or category data, 
these attributes are lumped together, and consumer choice is not observed. 
Therefore, one may obtain more reliable estimates by analyzing more 
disaggregated product-level data.  
However, to the best of my knowledge, investigations for beer demand at the 
product level are limited. My study is the first to study the demand for beer 
products. Promotion activities vary at the product level, and the estimated 
parameters can be pertained to each beer, ensuring a relatively precise 
estimate. Moreover, retailers’ revenue is more relevant to the overall 
performance of a category, which can be obtained by simply summarizing the 
income of each beer products. 
2.2 Beer Promotion  
The literature has documented the immediate promotional impacts on sales 
for frequently purchased goods. Guadagni and Little (1983) report a positive 
role of promotion in affecting consumer choice. Currim and Schneider (1991) 
demonstrate that households tend to buy more goods during promotional 
periods, and the tendency is higher for those actively search for discounts. 
Alvarez and Casielles (2005) show that price reduction leads to higher 
consumer satisfaction and higher choice probabilities.  
The literature also documents that promotion expands category demand. 
Gupta (1988) decomposes the sources of promotional sales and shows that 
category expansion constitutes a significant component of growth. 
Subsequent studies report an increasing proportion of sales from category 
expansion (Bell, Chiang, & Padmanabhan, 1999; Ailawadi, Harlam, & Cesar, 
2006; Richards, Gómez, & Pofahl, 2012). Promotion expands category 
demand in various ways: discount entices consumers to switch from other 
products with higher prices (Raju, 1992); Feature ad attracts new customers 
to enter the store (Briesch, Chintagunta, & Fox, 2009); promotion induces 
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stockpiling, which in turn encourages consumers to consume faster and 
purchase more (Ailawadi & Neslin, 1998). 
Enlightened by these studies, I concentrate on whether the promotion on 
beers expands the category demand, as this is the prerequisite for increasing 
retailers’ income.  
However, I find little limited studies on beer promotion. Harwood et al. (2003) 
and Bray, Loomis, & Engelen (2007) examine whether the in-store promotion 
targets particular users such as youth or racial minorities. Empen and 
Hamilton (2013) explore how sporting event affects retailers' pricing behavior. 
These two papers emphasize on impacts of demand shocks on the likelihood 
of promotion. Conversely, I study the effects of promotions on the demand for 
beers. Nakamura, Pechey, & Suhrcke (2014) use the supermarket data to 
evaluate the role of End-of-aisle Display in increasing sales of the beer 
category. They regard beer as an alcoholic beverage and compare it with 
other non-alcoholic beverages such as carbonated drinks and tea. My study 
differs in that I regard beer as a certain product and compare it with other beer 
products. Moreover, only focusing on one single promotion strategy maybe 
not sufficient to evaluate retailers’ benefit. In contrast, I evaluate the effects of 
various promotion strategies on the demand and explore the substitution 
within the beer category. To my best knowledge, there is no similar research 
in the literature. This paper aims to fill the gap. 
2.3 Random Coefficient Logit Model 
The discrete choice model has a long tradition and becomes influential since 
McFadden (1973) develops a conditional logit model, where consumer choice 
is explained by a bundle of product attributes rather than products per se. The 
logit model is parsimonious in parameters but exhibits the undesirable IIA 
property. That is, consumers facing the same product characteristic would 
make the same choices, even though they have different preferences. The 
BLP method takes into account the heterogeneity in consumer taste to avoid 
the IIA property. It also has the advantage of incorporating instrumental 
variables to deal with price endogeneity. For this reason, the BLP method has 
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been applied to a broad range of empirical problems with consumer choice, 
such as ready-to-eat cereal (Nevo, 2001), minivans (Petrin, 2002), and movie 
theaters (Davis, 2006). The applications of the BLP approach in the beer 
market include Beelitz (2009), who evaluates the coordinate effects after two 
breweries merge, and Toro-González, McCluskey, & Mittelhammer (2014), 
who study the trend of crafted beers in the US market. These two papers study 
beer brands or categories. My paper studies beer products with disaggregated 
data. I follow the BLP method to deal with a large number of beer products, 
preference heterogeneity, and price endogeneity. 
 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Logit Model 
In the discrete choice framework, consumer 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼 in market 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 
faces 𝐽 = 1, … , 𝐽𝑡 products and chooses product 𝑗 that maximizes her utility  
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡  = 𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡        (1) 
where 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the overall utility, 𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the deterministic component, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is 
an idiosyncratic shock. The first component, 𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽
′𝑥𝑗 , is a function of 
observed product characteristics (𝑥𝑗), and 𝛽 is a vector of coefficients to be 
estimated, representing consumer preferences for these characteristics. The 
second component, 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡, contains unobserved factors and is assumed to be 
an independently and identically distributed type I extreme value. 
The market share of product 𝑗 in market 𝑡  is the probability of consumers 
choosing it over all other 𝐽 − 1  alternatives. Therefore, 𝑆𝑗𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑈𝑖𝑗 >
𝑈𝑖𝑙) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜀𝑖𝑙 < 𝑉𝑖𝑗 − 𝑉𝑖𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗). The i.i.d. type I extreme value, 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡, has the 
density function 𝑓(𝜀) = 𝑒−𝑒
−𝜀
, which leads to the logit model 
𝑆𝑗𝑡 =
𝑒𝛽
′𝑥𝑗
1 + ∑ 𝑒𝛽′𝑥𝑙𝑙
        (2) 
This specification has a closed form and is simple to compute but exhibits the 
undesirable IIA property. The share ratio of two products,  
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𝑆𝑗𝑡
𝑆𝑙𝑡
=
𝑒𝛽
′𝑥𝑗
𝑒𝛽′𝑥𝑙
  
depends only on the characteristics of these two products and is independent 
of irrelevant alternatives (hence the name IIA). Suppose 𝑗 is a light beer and 𝑙 
a stronger one. When a new light beer is introduced into the market, we would 
expect it to grab more shares from 𝑗 than from 𝑙, but the IIA assumes that 
these two beers will lose market shares with equal proportion, and the share 
ratio will remain the same. This may not be true in many applications. 
The IIA also implies a restrictive substitution pattern. the cross-price elasticity, 
which measures the percentage change in demand for beer 𝑗 caused by one 
percentage change in the price of beer 𝑙, is given by  
𝐸𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑙 = 𝛽 ∙ 𝑝𝑙 ∙ 𝑆𝑙 
where 𝛽 is the coefficient on the price of beer 𝑝𝑙. It depends only on beer 𝑙′𝑠 
price and share, and is constant for all other beers, meaning that a small 
change in 𝑝𝑙 has equal impacts on demand for all other beers in the market.  
Similarly, the own-price elasticity 
𝐸𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑗 = −𝛽 ∙ 𝑝𝑗 ∙ (1 − 𝑆𝑗) 
is also questionable. It is mainly driven by 𝑝𝑗 because 𝑆𝑗 is usually small in a 
market with many products. The own-price elasticity given by the logit model 
implies that beers with higher prices tend to be more elastic. This is not 
realistic unless expensive beers also have higher marginal costs.  
The logit model has another drawback of not accounting for preference 
heterogeneity. In order to maximize his or her utility, a consumer will choose 
a product with either higher 𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡, or a higher 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡. The deterministic utility, 𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
𝛽′𝑥𝑗 , is the same for all consumers, as they face the same product 
characteristics and share common taste parameters 𝛽 . Thus, the 
heterogeneity would only come from 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡. However, its i.i.d. structure predicts 
that all consumers have an identical rank for unobserved product 
characteristics. This is often not the case. Some consumers may be more 
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easily attracted by Display whiles others may prefer to buy fresh beers. 
Ignoring preference heterogeneity can lead to misunderstanding of consumer 
behavior and inefficient use of marketing strategies. It can also cause bias in 
estimation (Erdem, Keane, & Sun, 2008).  
3.2 Random Coefficient Logit Model  
The BLP approach overcomes the IIA problem by allowing each consumer to 
have a different preference for observed product characteristics. Nevo (2000) 
explains in detail how the approach works. Kim, Song, & Xu (2017) provides 
an easier understanding of the process. In this section, I follow the instruction 
of Nevo (2000) and borrow the description of the method from Kim et al. (2017). 
Let individual-specific taste parameters 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽 + Σ𝑣𝑖 , where 𝛽  is the mean 
preference, 𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝑰) denote the unobserved individual characteristics, and 
Σ is the covariance matrix of 𝛽.  Σ𝑣𝑖 measures how taste preferences vary with 
individuals. Then the random coefficient logit model can be expressed as  
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑥𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 + 𝑥𝑗𝑡
′ Σ𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
                       = 𝛿𝑗𝑡 + 𝑥𝑗𝑡
′ Σ𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                      (3) 
where 𝛿𝑗𝑡 is the mean utility that is common to all consumers,  𝑥𝑗𝑡
′ Σ𝑣𝑖 captures 
the heterogeneity that depends on the observed attributes, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the i.i.d. 
type I extreme value. The mean utility, 𝛿𝑗𝑡 = 𝑥𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 , has two parts: 𝑥𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽 
stands for the utility from observed product characteristics and 𝜉𝑗𝑡 stands for 
the unobserved. 
Incorporating random coefficients, the individual probability defined by 
Equation (2) becomes 
𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
exp(𝛿𝑗𝑡 + 𝑥𝑗𝑡
′ Σ𝑣𝑖)
1 + ∑ exp(𝛿𝑙𝑡 + 𝑥𝑙𝑡
′ Σ𝑣𝑖)𝑙
  
The market share of product 𝑗 in market 𝑡 under 𝛿𝑡 and Σ can be obtained by 
integrating over the distribution of individual characteristics   
𝑆𝑗𝑡 = ∫ 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡(𝑥𝑗𝑡 , 𝛿𝑗𝑡)𝑓(𝑣)𝑑𝑣              (4) 
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where 𝑓(𝑣) is the density function of 𝑣𝑖. Now, the market share is a weighted 
individual share with weights given by 𝑓(𝑣). The proportion of consumers who 
would rank product 𝑗 as their first choice is determined by the density of these 
consumers, rather than equal to the average in the population.  
Equation (4) has no analytical form and can be approximated by  
𝑆𝑗𝑡 = (
1
𝑁
) ∑ [
exp(𝛿𝑗𝑡 + 𝑥𝑗𝑡
′ Σ𝑣𝑖)
1 + ∑ exp(𝛿𝑙𝑡 + 𝑥𝑙𝑡
′ Σ𝑣𝑖)𝑙
]
𝑁
              (5) 
where 𝑁 is the number of individuals in market 𝑡.  
The random coefficient logit model corrects the IIA property in the following 
way. In the utility function given by Equation (3), 𝑥𝑗𝑡
′ Σ𝑣𝑖  interacts product 
characteristics with individual characteristics, thereby establishing 
correlations between similar products. When the price of Bud Light increases, 
consumers preferring light beer would be more likely to buy Coors Light. 
Consequently, the market share ratio between Bud Light and Coors Light no 
longer only depends on the attributes of these two beers. The IIA restriction is 
relaxed.  
More importantly, relaxing the i.i.d. assumption also allows for a more realistic 
substitution pattern. The cross-price elasticities  
𝐸𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑙 = −
𝑝𝑙𝑡
𝑆𝑗𝑡
∫ 𝛽𝑖 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑓(𝑣)𝑑𝑣         (6) 
are determined by the interaction between individual and product 
characteristics. Thus, if the price of beer 𝑙 increases, consumers will switch to 
products with similar attributes.  
The own-price elasticities are  
 
𝐸𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑗𝑡 = −
𝑝
𝑗𝑡
𝑆𝑗𝑡
∫ 𝛽
𝑖
𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡(1 − 𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡)𝑓(𝑣)𝑑𝑣       (7) 
Recall that the own-price elasticities in the logit model are mainly driven by 
prices. In the random coefficient logit model, they also depend on individual-
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specific price parameters, 𝛽𝑖, meaning that higher price sensitivity will lead to 
higher elasticity (in absolute value). This pattern is more intuitive than that of 
the logit model.   
Another significant benefit of the BLP model is that it explicitly models the 
unobserved characteristics, 𝜉𝑗𝑡, enabling the use of instruments to deal with 
the endogeneity problem. I elaborate on this in the next section.  
3.3 Price Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables 
In the discrete choice model, a product is defined as a set of product 
characteristics. Consumers and producers are assumed to observe all these 
characteristics, whereas researchers only observe some of them. If 
unobservables affect both consumers’ purchasing decision and producers’ 
pricing strategy, endogeneity of price may arise. My estimation procedures 
consider the brand and store dummies to control for fixed effects that do not 
vary across products or markets. However, there still are some time-varying 
shocks that are correlated with the beer prices. For example, consumers may 
buy more beers during a baseball event and become less price sensitive. 
Retailers know this and increase prices of beers to raise sales (Empen & 
Hamilton, 2013). This demand shock cannot be quantified by researchers, 
giving rise to endogeneity in price. I use instruments to address this problem. 
Following the practice of Nevo (2001), who uses prices from other cities to 
instrument price of ready-to-eat cereals, I construct instruments for beer prices 
using prices from markets in other cities. The price of beer 𝑗 in market 𝑡 is 
instrumented by the average price of beer 𝑗 in 10 markets in nearby cities. I 
construct 10 such instruments to improve the precision of the estimate. The 
robustness test shows that the results are not sensitive to the choice of 
markets. The average prices from other cities can be valid instruments under 
certain assumptions (Hausman & Leonard, 1996). The same beer products 
usually have a common cost; therefore, their prices are correlated. Assuming 
that city-specific factors are independent of each other, prices from one city 
are less likely to pick demand shocks to other cities, satisfying the exogeneity 
condition. 
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3.4 Estimation 
The estimation strategy is to minimize the distance between market shares 
predicted by Equation (5) and the observed shares. Calculating Equation (5) 
requires values for 𝛿𝑗𝑡 and Σ𝑣𝑖.  
Let 𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝐈) and draw 𝑁 individuals for each market from its distribution. A 
large 𝑁 can reduce the approximation error. In my analysis, the estimates do 
not change much when 𝑁 gets close to 100. Therefore, I draw 100 individuals 
for each market.   
The solution to 𝛿𝑡 is solved to equate the observed market shares to predicted 
shares. For a given Σ, let 𝛿𝑡(Σ) satisfy  
𝑆𝑡(𝛿𝑡(Σ), Σ) = 𝑆𝑜𝑏𝑠 ⟺ 𝛿𝑡(Σ) = 𝑆𝑡
−1(𝑆𝑜𝑏𝑠, Σ)        (8) 
where 𝑆𝑜𝑏𝑠 is the observed market share and 𝑆𝑡 is the predicted share. Since 
Σ enters Equation (5) nonlinearly, 𝛿𝑡(Σ) is solved by recursive iteration. The 
BLP method proposes a contraction map, which amounts to computing the 
series   
𝛿𝑡
ℎ+1 = 𝛿𝑡
ℎ  + ln (𝑆𝑜𝑏𝑠) − ln (𝑆𝑗𝑡) 
where ℎ  is the smallest integer such that ‖𝛿𝑡
ℎ − 𝛿𝑡
ℎ−1‖  is smaller than a 
specific tolerance level, and 𝛿𝑡
ℎ is the approximation to 𝛿𝑡.  
After obtaining the value for 𝛿𝑡(Σ), I can solve the unobserved error term 
𝜉𝑡(𝛽, Σ) = 𝛿𝑡(Σ) − 𝑥𝑡𝛽        (9)  
where 𝑥𝑡 is the observed beer characteristics in market 𝑡. Then interact 𝜉 with 
the instrument matrix 𝑍 to form a GMM objective function 
𝜉(𝛽, Σ)′𝑍𝑊−1𝑍′𝜉(𝛽, Σ) 
= (𝛿(Σ) − 𝑋𝛽)′𝑍𝑊−1𝑍′(𝛿(Σ) − 𝑋𝛽)        (10) 
where 𝑊  is a consistent estimate of  𝐸[𝑍′𝜉𝜉′𝑍] . Assuming 𝑍  satisfies the 
exogeneity conditions, the objective function at the true value of (𝛽, Σ) equals 
zero. The task then is to find optimal values of (𝛽, Σ) that minimize the GMM 
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objective function. This requires a non-linear search in the parameter space 
and is time costly. By expressing 𝛽 as a function of Σ, the search can be 
limited to Σ. Since the GMM estimator has no analytical form, it can be solved 
numerically: iteratively evaluate Equation (10) at different values of Σ until 
finding the minimum. The starting value for Σ is a guess, and the estimates 
are robust to different starting values. 
With the estimated value of Σ, the solution to 𝛽 is given by Equation (10)  
?̂?(Σ̂) = (𝑋′𝑍𝑊−1𝑍′𝑋)−1𝑋′𝑍𝑊−1𝑍′𝛿(Σ̂) 
which is a linear GMM estimator. Finally, the solution is (?̂?(Σ̂), Σ̂) with the 
optimal value of Σ. 
 
4 Data 
4.1 Scanner Data 
The scanner data are provided by IRI1, a market research firm. The IRI data 
are collected from grocery stores, drug stores, and mass stores in 50 US 
metropolitan cities. I construct my sample using beers data from the City of 
Los Angeles. In the LA data, the beers sold in the grocery stores account for 
88% of total sales. To obtain a relatively homogeneous store characteristic, I 
restrict to the grocery store in my analysis.  
The beer demand is estimated for each market, which is defined as a store-
week combination in this analysis. The market share for each beer product is 
the quantity sold divided by the number of households in that market. Due to 
numerous beer products in the original LA data, I drop beers that have market 
shares less than 0.1%. The final sample includes 78 grocery stores over 54 
weeks in the year 2010. There is a total of 3,764 markets that sell a total of 
207 beer products. Each beer in each market is an observation, this gives me 
a total of 503,951 observations in the final sample. The number of beer 
 
1 I would like to thank IRI. for making the data available. All estimates and analysis in this 
paper, based on data provided by IRI. are by the author and not by IRI. 
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products differs across markets, and the beers in each market constitute a 
choice set for consumers in that market. 
Note that the sum of market shares for each market does not equal to one. 
Recall that a consumer in the utility function is assumed to choose one beer 
product out of 𝐽 alternatives on each shopping trip. They may also choose not 
to buy any beer. In other words, they are allowed to buy outside goods. Thus, 
when prices of beer increase, the total volume of beer sales also changes, 
rather than being forced to fix (Berry,1994). The existence of outside goods is 
important in my analysis because it allows for the sales volume to grow due 
to promotion.  
4.2 Variables  
In the random coefficient discrete choice model, the market share is derived 
from choice probability. Therefore, the consumer choice is the dependent 
variable that equals one if a beer is chosen by a consumer and zero, otherwise. 
The point-of-sales data include sales, quantity, promotion status, as well as 
other product attributes such as brand and volume. These product 
characteristics are the regressors. Price is the actual price paid by consumers, 
net of discount. Promotions variables have 5 different forms. Price Reduction 
is a dummy variable that equals one if the temporary price cut is more than 
5%. Feature ad is a print advertisement in stores’ weekly newspapers, 
including a large-size ad (Major Feature ad) and a medium-size ad (Feature 
ad).  Display also includes two forms: an array at the end of an aisle (End-of-
aisle Display) and an array on the shelf (Display). These promotion variables 
are 0-1 indicator variables, representing the promotion status for each product.  
Other control variables include product characteristics such as volume, 
alcohol content, and packaging. Volume is measured in ounces divided by 
288 ounces, e.g., a 72-oz beer is recorded as 72/288=0.25. This variable 
represents the size of beer. There are 22 different levels of volumes in the 
sample, but I assume the variable to be continuous. The alcohol content is a 
measure of how much ethanol is contained in a given volume of a beer. I 
manually collect the alcohol content from various websites, mainly 
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Beeradvocate, (n.d.). Packaging refers to the different materials and shapes 
in which a beer is packed, such as cans and glass bottles. There are 11 types 
of packages in the sample. Brand dummies serve to control for the product-
specific effects. 
These product characteristics are unique to each beer. The outside good has 
no observed product characteristics, and the general practice is to normalize 
their deterministic utilities to zero, i.e., 𝑈𝑛0𝑡 = 𝜀𝑛0𝑡 (Berry, 1994). 
4.3 Summary Statistics 
Figure 1 plots the sales of beers (in quantity) and frequency of Price Reduction 
in all stores in 54 weeks of the year 2010. There appears to be a pattern in 
the plot. The quantity of beers sold (green line) tends to fluctuate together with 
the frequency of Price Reduction (red line) throughout the year. For example, 
they both peak in mid-year and reach a minimum in the third quarter. During 
other periods such as week 6/7 and week 32/33, there are occasional spikes 
for the two variables. I observe similar patterns for most of the stores in the 
sample. Are sales driven by promotion? Does an increase in quantities imply 
an increase in retailers’ revenues? This study will provide answers to these 
questions. 
 
Figure 1 Salse and Price Reduction 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
   
Variable Unit Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Market Shares %   0.001  0.002      0.000   0.085  
Quantity 1     8.429    16.060  1     820  
Price US$ 10.576    6.038     0.600     34.990  
Promotion Variable          
Major Feature ad 0/1 0.064       0.245  0      1  
Line Feature ad 0/1     0.054        0.226  0        1  
Shelf Display 0/1     0.055      0.227  0         1  
End-of-Aisle Display 0/1     0.022      0.145  0         1  
Price Reduction 0/1     0.296      0.457  0         1  
Alcohol %     4.624      0.996        0.400        8.100  
Volume 288 oz     0.465      0.351  0.042         1.500  
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables that are included in the 
analysis. Most of the beers in the sample have very small market shares, with 
a maximum of 0.085%. This is dut to the large number of products available 
in the market. Quantity sold in each market varies widely due to variation in 
the market characteristics, such as the number of households. The average 
beer price is $10.6. In addition, I find that the price and the volume are 
positively correlated.  
Among various promotion options, Price Reduction is most frequently used, 
with a mean value of 0.296, much higher than other options. Major Feature 
has a higher frequency (0.064) than Line Feature ad (0.054). End-of-Aisle 
Display is less offered (0.022), maybe due to limited places in stores. 
The mean value of alcohol content is 4.6%. I also find that beers with alcohol 
content ranging from 4% to 5.5% account for 90% of total sales.  
Table 2 reports a detailed breakdown for volume in ascending order. I group 
beers of different levels of volumes into 4 groups and represent them by rows. 
The first column under “Quantity” represents the sales of beers sold for each 
volume. The second to the last columns show how many times they are 
promoted during the sample period. For example, beers with a volume less 
than 0.25 have been promoted for 13,276 times in the form of Price Reduction 
during the sample period. The two groups of small-sized beers have more 
sales than the larger ones, even though they are less promoted. Jain (2012) 
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Table 2 Summary of Volume 
  
Volume 
  
Quantities 
  
Price 
Reduction 
Major  
Feature ad 
Line  
Feature ad 
Shelf  
Display 
End-of-aisle 
Display 
(0 ~ 0.25) 1,451,428 13,276 177 426 534 248 
[0.25 ~ 0.5) 636,602 30,240 2,039 2,341 1,770 651 
[0.5 ~ 1) 1,287,963 83,322 18,017 15,875 13,903 4,683 
[1 ~ 1.5) 871,625 22,370 11,971 8,566 11,318 5,269 
 
hypothesizes that it is because consumers attempt to control their 
consumption of alcohol. The most frequently promoted volume is the 0.5~1 
group, followed by the 1~1.5 group. It appears that consumers respond to the 
promotion - these two groups also have higher sales.  
Among 11 types of packages in the sample (not shown in Table 1 due to space 
consideration), beers packed in can-in-box and can are most popular. The 
former has a larger size and is more frequently promoted than the latter.  
 
5 Estimated Results 
I construct five different specifications. Model (1) is the simplest specification 
that considers price, brand dummies, and beer attributes (volume, alcohol 
content, and packaging). Models (2) to (4) extend Model (1) by subsequently 
including promotion variables, i.e., Feature ad, Display, and Price Reduction. 
The purpose is to track their separate effects on beer demand. Model (5) is 
the random coefficients logit model. It augments Model (4) by letting 
continuous variables (i.e., price, volume, and alcohol content) to have random 
coefficients that vary over individuals. The first column of Model (5) provides 
the estimated mean coefficients on beer characteristics that enter the mean 
utility in Equation (3). The second column lists the estimated standard 
deviations of the random coefficients. They are estimates of heterogeneity of 
these attributes, representing the impact of the unobserved individual 
characteristics on market shares. Across all models, prices are instrumented, 
and packaging and brand-fixed effects are included.  
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Table 3 Estimated Results 
  
  
Model (1) 
Benchmark 
Model 
Model (2) 
+ Feature 
ad 
Model (3) 
+ Display 
Model (4) 
 + Price 
Reduction 
Model (5) 
Random 
Coefficients Model 
(Intercept) -17.072 -15.020 -14.549 -13.578 -13.313   
  (0.958) (0.965) (0.965) (0.960) (1.080)   
Price -0.242 -0.210 -0.204 -0.191 -0.184 0.069  
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) 
Volume 2.811  2.317  2.104  2.048  1.763  0.573  
  (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.478) (0.497) 
Alcohol 2.652  2.058  1.920  1.627  1.549  0.033  
  (0.275) (0.276) (0.277) (0.275) (0.320) (0.339) 
Line feature ad   0.399  0.327  0.295  0.297    
    (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)   
Major feature ad   0.552  0.452  0.422  0.426    
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012)   
Shelf Display     0.436  0.429  0.430    
      (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)   
End-of-aisle Display     0.485  0.475  0.477    
      (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)   
Price Reduction       0.092  0.099    
        (0.004) (0.012)   
GMM Objective 2,417 1,660 1,441 1,414 1,407   
 
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) 
for the five specifications. The estimated coefficients all have expected signs 
and are fairly stable across different models, but the magnitudes of the 
estimates reduce as more variables are included. These changes imply that 
the estimated coefficients of the simpler models, e.g., Models (1) to (3), are 
upwardly biased because they compound the effects of not-included 
promotion options. A common issue in many studies is the multicollinearity 
among promotion variables as they often take place simultaneously (Blattberg 
& Neslin, 1989). The stability of coefficients across models suggests that the 
correlation between promotion variables is not a serious concern in this study. 
The GMM objective function evaluated at different estimates decreases 
gradually as more regressors are included, suggesting ab increased quality of 
fit. Of all models, Model (5) allows a more flexible utility specification and 
generates a more realistic substitution pattern, as discussed by Berry et al. 
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(1995). It also has the minimum GMM objective function evaluated at the 
estimates. Therefore, I focus on Model (5) in what follows. 
The estimated coefficient on price is statistically significant at 5% level and 
has a negative sign (-0.184), consistent with the notation that consumers are 
price averse on average. The standard deviation of the price coefficient is 
highly significant (0.069 in the last column), strong evidence that there is 
heterogeneity in price sensitivity. It might be the case that people who are 
addicted to alcohol care less about the price, while elderly consumers can 
switch to other alcohol more easily than the youth when beer price increases.   
All promotion variables are significant, suggesting that consumers respond to 
promotion activities. The positive signs of coefficients are consistent with the 
expectation that the marketing input is effective. Since they are all dummy 
variables, I can compare the magnitudes of their parameters.  
The parameters of Major Feature ad (0.426) and Linear Feature ad (0.297) 
show that the larger-size advertisement in stores’ newspapers is more 
effective than the medium-size ad in drawing customers. This is consistent 
with previous findings (Pieters, Wedel, & Zhang 2007).  
End-of-Aisle Display is the most effective marketing device among all others 
in terms of the magnitude of coefficients (0.477). As Hoch and Deighton (1989) 
suggest, a majority of consumers make temporal decisions in stores. Display 
plays an important role in stimulating impulse purchase, and a larger space of 
array is more efficient in attracting buyers. Shelf Display has a slightly smaller 
coefficient (0.430) than End-of-Aisle Display, also an important marketing 
strategy. One reason may be that consumers expect the most popular 
products to be displayed in the middle of the shelves. Retailers appeal to this 
preference and do display popular beers there, enhancing the purchase 
probabilities (Valenzuela and Raghubir, 2009). Note that Shelf Display is more 
precisely estimated than other promotion variables (having the largest t-
statistics) in Model (5), implying more variation fort this promotion status in the 
data. It might be the case where the store managers rotate the shelf more 
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frequently. Alternatively, there might be more agreement in consumer 
preference for this marketing device.  
Price Reduction has a small coefficient. It contradicts my expectation that it is 
a more effective promotion device as it has the highest frequency, as indicated 
in Table 1 (summary statistics).  Note that Price Reduction is an indicator 
variable of a price cut, not the amount of discount. My hypothesis is that only 
signaling a price cut is not attractive enough to induce purchases. The effect 
of Price Reduction is already captured by another variable, ‘price’. In the policy 
simulation section, I address this issue by recovering the price to non-
promotion amount, then evaluate the effects of Price Reduction with different 
discount rates.  
Volume has a statistically significant and positive coefficient (1.763), indicating 
that consumers place a greater value on large-sized beers. This is intuitive 
since addicted people attempt to intake more alcohol. Another reason may be 
that other things being equal, larger size beers have smaller prices per volume. 
Bray et al. (2009) show that people attempt to buy a larger size to get more 
discount. The standard deviation (0.573) of the preference is not precisely 
measured with a t-ration of -1.154. Therefore, there is no strong evidence of 
heterogeneity in consumer taste for volume.  
Alcohol is statistically significant in the mean parameter and has a positive 
effect (1.549) in influencing consumer decisions. This is expected as people 
drink beers for the alcoholic attribute. The standard deviation is not significant; 
therefore, I cannot conclude that there is heterogeneity in this attribute.  
Estimates of packaging constants are shown in Table 4. There are 11 types 
of packages in the sample. To reserve the space, I report 7 types, where “Can” 
is the reference level and is excluded. In terms of shapes and materials of 
packages, beers in bottle glass are more popular than beers in can, and long-
neck-bottle are least popular. Previous papers explain that consumers may 
perceive bottled beers to contain more volume than canned beers (Yang &  
Raghubir, 2005), or that consumers may believe beers from bottles taste 
better (Barnett, Velasco, & Spence, 2016). In terms of package size, beers in 
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Table 4 Estimated Packing Coefficients  
Packaging 
Estimated  
Coefficients Standard Error 
Can 0   
Can in box 0.050 (0.073) 
Glass Bottle 0.378 (0.014) 
Glass bottle in carton 0.353 (0.045) 
Glass bottle in box 0.723 (0.075) 
Long neck bottle in box 0.101 (0.082) 
Long neck bottle in carton -0.196 (0.046) 
 
box and carton are more popular, as in agreement with the positive coefficient 
on volume variable. 
Brand dummies represent the inherent preference of consumers for these 
brands, most of which are significant. I note that brands with higher observed 
market shares do not necessarily have larger positive coefficients.  This is due 
to that decision making takes into account all other beer characteristics. 
 
6 Price Elasticities 
I use the estimated coefficients to compute own-price and cross-price 
elasticities with Equation (7) and (6). The own-price elasticity is the 
percentage in the demand for beer associated with one percent change in its 
own price. It measures consumers’ price sensitivity. The cross-price elasticity 
is the percentage change of the demand for beer 𝑗 to one percentage change 
in beer 𝑙′𝑠 price. It measures the degree of substitutability from beer 𝑗 to beer 
𝑙.  
There are 207 beer products in the sample, estimating all of which would give 
2072 elasticity terms. For an illustration, I focus on 10 beers with top market 
shares in a certain market, thereby I only need to display 100 estimates. Table 
5 shows the matrix of estimated price-elasticities. In Panel A, I display beer 
characteristics as they are related to the substitution pattern. In Panel B, I list 
the elasticity terms, where the diagonal elements are own-price elasticities, 
and the off-diagonal elements are cross-price elasticities. Numbers in Panel 
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B represent the response of beer in rows to the price change of beer in 
columns. For example, the second cell in the first column (0.033) means that 
1% increase in beer B’s price would reduce beer A’s share by 0.033%.  
6.1 Own-Price Elasticities 
All own-price elasticities are negative, ranging from -0.27 to -2.28. The own-
price elasticities at the product level here are smaller in absolute value than 
the own-price elasticities at the brand level reported by previous studies. For 
example, Beelitz (2009) documents a median own-price elasticity of -6.05, and 
Rojas (2005) documents -3.34. Ruhm et al. (2012) provide a reason for the 
difference. The aggregated data suffer from measurement error in price and 
may result in upwardly biased elasticities. They use the product-level data for 
alcohol and obtain much lower estimates, justifying the use of disaggregated 
data to study beer demand. 
About 70% of beers in this market are price elastic, i.e., own-price elasticities 
are greater than one in absolute value. Referring to the third column in Panel 
B, I find that own-price elasticities decline almost monotonically with the price. 
That is, the demand for high-price beers tends to be more elastic, suggesting 
that expensive beers can be regarded as luxury goods. I also notice that other 
things being equal, beers with higher market shares are less elastic. For 
example, beer E and beer F have similar product characteristics. Beer E has 
a higher market share but a smaller own-price elasticity in absolute value. This 
finding is in agreement with the notation that big brands are more able to 
reduce price sensitivity towards their products (Guadagni & Little, 1983; 
Hausman, Leonard, & Zona, 1994). The implication is that retailers can raise 
the prices of popular beers without losing as many buyers. I also observe that 
products with attributes that would increase consumers’ utility, e.g., large size 
or high alcohol content, are more inelastic.  
6.2 Cross-Price Elasticities 
The cross-price elasticities are all positive, implying that beers are substitutes 
for each other. The estimates are much smaller than own-price elasticities in 
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TABLE 5 Estimated Price Elasticities  
  
Panel A             
Beer 
Market 
shares 
Price Volume Alcohol   Brand Packaging 
A 0.57% $23.98 1.5 4.2   Bud Light Can in Box 
B 0.70% $20.76 1.25 4.2   Bud Light Can in Box 
C 0.59% $13.98 1.25 4.2   Natural Light Can in Box 
D 0.70% $13.02 0.5 4.6   Corona Extra Long Neck Bottle in Box 
E 0.94% $11.98 0.75 4.2   Bud Light Can in Box 
F 0.43% $11.98 0.75 4.2   Bud Light Long Neck Bottle in Box 
G 0.48% $4.48 0.25 4.2   Bud Light Plastic Wide Mouth in Can 
H 0.98% $1.58 0.11 5   Miller High Life Glass Bottle 
I 0.66% $1.58 0.11 6   King Cobra Glass Bottle 
G 0.92% $1.48 0.11 5.5   Bud Ice Glass Bottle 
 
Panel B                   
Beer A B C D E F G H I G 
A -2.2814 0.0346 0.0168 0.0146 0.0188 0.0087 0.0024 0.0015 0.0010 0.0013 
B 0.0328 -2.2718 0.0167 0.0153 0.0195 0.0090 0.0027 0.0017 0.0012 0.0015 
C 0.0281 0.0295 -1.9346 0.0159 0.0210 0.0097 0.0033 0.0022 0.0015 0.0020 
D 0.0220 0.0244 0.0144 -1.8301 0.0190 0.0088 0.0033 0.0023 0.0015 0.0020 
E 0.0230 0.0252 0.0154 0.0154 -1.7369 0.0091 0.0034 0.0023 0.0016 0.0021 
F 0.0230 0.0252 0.0154 0.0154 0.0197 -1.7475 0.0034 0.0023 0.0016 0.0021 
G 0.0153 0.0184 0.0128 0.0140 0.0178 0.0083 -0.7805 0.0028 0.0019 0.0025 
H 0.0132 0.0163 0.0119 0.0133 0.0170 0.0079 0.0038 -0.2919 0.0020 0.0026 
I 0.0133 0.0164 0.0120 0.0134 0.0171 0.0079 0.0039 0.0030 -0.2927 0.0026 
G 0.0132 0.0163 0.0119 0.0133 0.0171 0.0079 0.0039 0.0030 0.0020 -0.2741 
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absolute value, suggesting that consumers tend to be loyal to their preferred 
products (Toro-González et al., 2014). This being the case, when the price of 
inside goods increases, consumers would be more likely to switch to outside 
goods than to another beer. For example, a consumer who drinks Corona 
Light would not buy a Budweiser even if the latter is at a discount. On the other 
hand, it suggests that new customers who are price-sensitive are more likely 
to purchase promoted beers. The substitution pattern may play a crucial role 
in policy analysis. The small cross-price elasticities would imply that demands 
for different beers are relatively independent (Toro-González et al., 2014). 
The estimated cross-price elasticities reveal another pattern. Beers sharing 
similar attributes are close substitutes towards each other. For instance, the 
column for beer B represents its substitution pattern towards other beers that 
are listed in rows. The effect is most substantial for beer A (0.0346) than for 
others, as beer B and beer A have very similar attributes, including price, 
alcohol, brand, and packaging (as shown in Panel A). Thus, reducing beer B’s 
price would cannibalize the sales of beer A more than beer C or D.  
Another pattern is that, between two similar beers, the substitution effects are 
asymmetric. Beer E and F are two very similar products, but beer E is a 
stronger substitute (0.0197 vs. 0.0091). The only difference between these 
two beers is the packaging. Note that consumers prefer the way beer E is 
packaged, i.e., can-in-box has a greater positive coefficient than long-neck 
bottle; see Table 3. This may explain why beer E is less substituted by beer 
F.  
I also find that beers of lower prices have lower substitution effects. For 
example, the first row of Panel B shows that the cross-price elasticities get 
smaller as price decreases, i.e., from beer B to beer G, and this pattern 
appears in other rows as well. This pattern suggests that consumers preferring 
low-priced beers would stay with outside goods when the prices of their 
preferred beers increase. Berry et al. (1995) find the same pattern in the study 
of automobiles. One implication is that low-price policy is more likely to attract 
consumers who prefer cheap beers. These consumers would be less likely to 
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switch to more expensive beers. Then, promotions on low-price beers would 
be inefficient.  
In brief, beers of higher prices tend to be more elastic than beers of lower 
prices. Beers are weak substitutes for each other, but the substitution is 
stronger between similar products. Between similar products, the substitute 
patterns are asymmetric. The ones with attributes that would increase 
consumers’ utility have stronger substitution toward others. The low-price 
beers may not be suitable products to promote due to less efficiency. These 
findings provide instructions as to how to organize the promotion strategies in 
the policy simulation. 
 
7 Policy Simulation 
In this section, I apply the findings from estimated coefficients and elasticities 
to perform the policy simulation. I this procedure, I compute the incremental 
sales for beer as a measure of retailers’ gain due to promotion.   
Before conducting the experiments, I select markets in which I perform 
simulation, the beer products to be promoted, and the promotion policies to 
be implemented. Since the focus is on retailers' revenues, I concentrate on 
markets managed by one retailer. There are four retailers in the data. Among 
them, I randomly pick a retailer that owns 1094 markets that account for 30% 
of the total sales in the sample. I simulate promotion for these markets. 
Assuming that retailers are more concerned about beer products with higher 
market penetration, I consider beers with the top market shares as the product 
to be promoted. Assuming that all stores display beer products at the end of 
aisles once in every three weeks, I simulate the promotion with this frequency. 
In deciding the number of items to be promoted, I refer to the data information, 
where the store owners implement End-of-aisle Display for 5 beers per week, 
on average. Therefore, I choose 5 beers.  
Of all five promotion options, I choose Price Reduction, Major Feature ad, and 
End-of-aisle Display. These three options are representative as they widely 
used by retailers and serve different purposes. Note that Price Reduction is a 
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dummy variable signaling that there is a price cut, which is usually 
accompanied by a discount. There are two forms of Display and two forms of 
Feature ad. Assuming that larger-size advertising is more effective, I employ 
Major Feature ad and End-of-Aisle Display.  
Having decided on the products and policy options to use, I list 5 promotion 
scenarios, each corresponding to a different promotion policy, including  
i) Price Reduction 
ii) Major Feature ad 
iii) End-of-Aisle Display  
iv) the joint use of Major Feature ad and End-of-Aisle Display 
v) the joint use of all three promotion devices. 
 
For each scenario, I compute the hypothetical non-promotional sales when no 
promotion activities take place. This provides a baseline revenue against 
which I can compare promotional revenue and obtain incremental sales. The 
formula calculating the promotional gain is  
Incremental gains(%) =
revenue with promotion
revenue without promotion
− 1 
where the revenue is the price of a beer multiplied by its market share, which 
is given by Equation (5). The incremental sales are measured in percentage, 
representing the percentage increase in sales due to promotion.  
Table 6 documents the increase in total revenues of beers sold in the chosen 
markets, including revenues of promoted beers and non-promoted beers. The 
figures represent the sales growth of the beer category. In this study, the beer 
category refers to beer as a beverage. For example, soft drink is another 
category.   
I organize Table 6 in the following way. Rows list different types of promotion 
tools, and columns list different discount rates. For example, the first cell in 
the first column represents the non-promotional sales (0%). The second cell 
in the same column means that Major Feature ad alone increases the sales 
by 11%. The second to the fourth columns show the promotion effects at 
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Table 6 Effect of Policy Policies 
  Discount 
    0% Price off 10% Price off 20% Price off 30% Price off 
Price Reduction 0% 5% 8% 12% 
Feature ad 11% 18% 23% 28% 
Display 13% 20% 25% 31% 
Feature + Display 29% 40% 47% 54% 
 
different discount rates, from 10% to 30%, respectively. This range is within 
the scope of the discount rates in the data, which is about 5% to 50%. In this 
experiment, the Price Reduction indicator and price cut are used 
simultaneously. For example, in the case where a 30% discount is offered, 
consumers also see a price tag indicating that the price is at a discount.  
The first finding is that all the promotion policies have substantial impacts on 
sales for the beer category. All incremental sales are positive. This immediate 
impact has support in many empirical studies (Blattberg et al., 1995; Erdem 
et al., 2008; Dawes, 2004). Of the three separately used policies, End-of-Aisle 
Display raises sales for beer to the greatest extent (13%), indicating that 
retailers can take advantage of End-of-Aisle Display to its capacity, or improve 
the quality of Display to stimulate more impulse shopping. Major Feature ad 
generates a slight increment for the beer category (11%). It is an essential 
strategy to bring in new customers by informing them that certain beers are 
available at discounted prices. Therefore, retailers can often use the Feature 
ad, especially for beers with higher market penetration, which has larger pools 
of buyers. Price Reduction affects sales differently at different discount rates, 
ranging from 5% to 12%. At a 30% price off, the effect of Price Reduction is 
similar to Major Feature ad or End-of-Aisle Display. Thus, retailers would need 
to offer a deeper discount to achieve the same magnitude rise in revenue. On 
the other hand, retailers could achieve the same revenue without losing profit 
by using Display or End-of-Aisle Display. 
The second finding is that promotions generate synergy effects. The sales 
generated by the joint use of various promotion policies are greater than the 
sum of sales generated by individual policies. For example, the impacts of a 
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30% Price Reduction alone, a Major Feature ad alone, and an End-of-Aisle 
Display alone sum up to 36% (12%+11%+13%), whereas the combined use 
of all three tools increases sales by 54%. This “Big Bang” effect is also 
recognized in the literature; see, for example, Blattberg and Nelsin (1989) and 
Dawes (2004). Zhang (2006) argues that Feature and Display deliver the 
promotion information to consumers, and Price Reduction increases the 
attractiveness of a product, leading to a higher choice probability. A relevant 
policy recommendation is that retailers can collectively use different policies 
to maximize productivity with limited sources.  
Table 7 provides a breakdown of the beer category revenues by product, in 
the situation where a 30% discount is offered, corresponding to the last 
column in Table 6. In rows, I subsequently list the incremental revenues for 
the 5 promoted beers (beer K to beer O), their subtotal, non-promotional beers, 
and a grand total of the beer category. In columns, I list different policies in 
the same order as the rows of Table 6. For example, the first cell in column 2 
shows that Major Feature ad alone generates an additional 125% revenue for 
beer K at a 30% discount rate.  
The third finding is that promotion on beer expands the category demand. The 
sales of promoted beers cannibalize sales of non-promoted beers, but the 
overall gain is positive. When a 30% price cut is offered, the sales or the 
promoted beers increase by 121%, and the sales for non-promoted beers  
Table 7 Promotion Effects on Beer Products 
  
  
Normal 
price 
30% off  
 
30% off 
& Feature  
30% off 
& Display 
All three 
Policies 
Promoted beers      
    K $21.99 56% 125% 135% 232% 
    L $1.99 -16% 26% 32% 96% 
    M $21.99 56% 126% 136% 235% 
    N $24.99 58% 131% 141% 244% 
    O $1.99 -16% 25% 31% 93% 
Subtotal  52% 121% 131% 228% 
Non-promoted beers  -4% -8% -8% -14% 
Grand total  12% 28% 31% 54% 
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decrease by 8%, leading to a net gain of 28% for the whole category. This 
finding aligns with the analysis of elasticities, where the small cross-elasticities 
suggest product loyalty – existing customers do not give up their preferred 
beers when other beers reduce prices. Instead, incremental sales mainly 
come from outside goods. The role of promotions in expanding the category 
demand has been documented by many other articles, including Gupta (1988) 
and Dawes (2004). The implication is that store owners may promote some 
beers without worrying much about losing revenues from other beers as the 
overall gain would be positive. 
Another finding regarding Price Reduction is that discounting beers of low-
price may not benefit. The price of Beer L and beer O is $1.99, and their 
revenues drop by 16% when sold at a 30% price off. This suggests that the 
cheapest beers can be Giffen goods, and retailers may not be better off by 
promoting low-priced beers because their market shares increase slower than 
drops in prices.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper applies the BLP method to study the beer demand system using 
scanner data from the US grocery stores. It estimates own and cross-price 
elasticities to analyze substitution patterns of beer products. In addition, this 
study simulates the effects of various promotion strategies on stores’ 
revenues. 
The random coefficient logit model defines a product as a set of product 
characteristics and substantially decreases the number of parameters to be 
estimated. The random coefficients capture consumer preference 
heterogeneity and lead to flexible substitution patterns. The BLP method also 
explicitly specifies the unobserved product characteristics, allowing for the use 
of instrumental variables to deal with the price endogeneity. 
The scanner data provide disaggregated product information to evaluate the 
promotional performance of each beer products accurately.  
38 
 
The empirical results show that consumers are price averse but with 
heterogeneous preference. Consumers respond to promotion activities, 
especially to Display and Feature ad that effectively communicate promotion 
information to consumers. They also prefer beers of large size and high 
alcohol content, and there is no evident heterogeneity in these preferences. 
The estimated own-price elasticities suggest that expensive beers can be 
regarded as luxury goods, whereas cheaper beers can be Giffen goods. The 
estimated cross-price elasticities suggest that beers are substitutes for each 
other, but the substitution is small. Consumers tend to be loyal to their 
preferred beers and are less likely to switch to other beers; even the latter 
beers are promoted. Beers sharing the same product characteristics are close 
substitutes to each other, but the substitution patterns between products are 
asymmetric. Beers having attributes that are preferred by consumers have 
greater substitution effects. The results from policy simulation show that 
promotions increase sales of beers. Display and Feature have greater effects 
than Price Reduction, and retailers can achieve incremental sales using these 
two policies without reducing the prices. There are synergy effects when 
various marketing devices are used jointly. In addition, promotions can expand 
the demand for the beer category. Promotional sales from some beers 
cannibalize sales of other beers, but the overall gain is positive.  
The paper contributes to the literature as follows. First, it, for the time, studies 
the demand for beer at the product level. Previous studies mainly focus on 
beer brands or treat beer as an alcoholic beverage. It is also the first to 
measure the effects of various promotion strategies on beers’ market shares. 
Previous papers only study one strategy, such as Display. Second, my study 
fills the gap by documenting own and cross-price elasticities of beer demand. 
The difference between the estimated price elasticities of my research and 
previous research justifies the use of the product-level data for a more 
accurate estimate. Third, applying the BLP method in my analysis accounts 
for consumer preference heterogeneity and yields realistic substitution 
patterns. My findings provide insights into the nature of beer demand and 
explain the different substitution patterns of different beers. Last, the findings 
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in policy simulation provide a practical guidance for retailers to optimize 
marketing resources.  
My study can be extended in several aspects. First, lack of consumer-level 
panel data prevents me from reliably estimating a dynamic promotion effect 
and this study focuses on short-term effects of promotion on beer demand. 
Nevertheless, the short-term effects are essential because if promotions have 
no immediate effects, they are less likely to have long-term effects. The long-
run effect can be different from that in the short run. For example, very 
frequent promotions may reduce product attractiveness (Blattberg, et al., 
1995). Panel data report histories of purchases for households and can be 
used to extend the analysis to the long-term effect. By including a last-choice 
dummy variable, for example, one can measure whether a consumer who 
buys a beer on promotion would repurchase the same beer when there is no 
promotion (Guadagni & Little, 1983).  
Second, my study focuses on the impacts of promotions on sales of the beer 
category, among many alcoholic beverages. A more completive analysis of 
the beer demand system may be obtained by controlling for the effects of 
potential substitutes on the beer category, such as wine and spirits. The data 
I use dost not have such information. This is an area for future research. 
Last, the 0-1 promotion dummy variables lack the variation to incorporate 
consumer heterogeneity. Letting consumers preference vary over promotion 
dummies implies that consumers either like or do not like promotions, which 
is not realistic. However, my analysis can be easily extended when the data 
are available.  
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